

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

MAR 2 1966

MEMO TO: CIA [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: REPORT OF CODIB TASK TEAM VII


Attached are three copies of a preliminary draft report that follows [REDACTED] outline.

As you will note each section requires a certain amount of amplification, but, each I think, does reflect a sound approach. You will also note certain differences between this report and our earlier interim report.

Would you please give a copy to [REDACTED] and to [REDACTED]

I would hope that they might be able to edit it and add some additional suggestions. Once that is done I would like to call a meeting for further discussion towards the end of next week.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COORDINATION


A. Sidney Buford, III

Attachments:

As stated above.

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REPORT OF CODIB TASK TEAM VII
Analyst-to-Analyst Communication

A. Scope of the Problem

A1. In accordance with its terms of reference (CODIB-D-111/1.7/2), Task Team VII considered the problem of interagency communication between analysts who are engaged in the production and coordination of positive intelligence. The intelligence organizations involved, therefore, were the research offices in INR, most of the offices under DD(I) in CIA, and the two centers under the Assistant Director for Processing in DIA.

A2. For practical reasons, the Task Team concentrated on a single geographical area (viz., Latin America) and discussed all aspects of analyst communication with a substantial number of individuals working in this field. However, it also discussed the problem of improving analyst communication with selected intelligence officers in other geographic areas and has taken their views into account in preparing this report.

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B. Purposes Served by Analyst-to-Analyst Communication

B1. Broadly speaking, there are two modes of analyst-to-analyst communication. First, communication between counterparts in different agencies -- that is, between analysts who generally cover the same subject for their respective agencies. Second, contacting individuals who are knowledgeable about subjects which an analyst does not cover in detail or does not follow at all.

B2. Communication between counterparts is usually for the purpose of exchanging views on topics of mutual interest and to check whether there is any additional information available. They sometimes check with each other to avoid duplication of effort. It is established practice, of course, for intelligence officers to coordinate CIB items with their opposite numbers in other agencies; however, communication for the express purpose of obtaining concurrence on a current intelligence topic or on substantive judgments in an NIE are special cases. For the most part, we are concerned in this report with analyst-to-analyst communication which does not involve formal concurrence.

B3. The second mode of interagency communication is invariably for the purpose of obtaining information. When an analyst needs information on a subject outside of his field he typically seeks assistance from his colleagues in his own agency, but in many cases he knows in advance that the kind of information sought can be obtained only from knowledgeable officers in other agencies. For example, a political analyst may need detailed information about military matters or an economic analyst may require statistical data which other agencies

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C. Existing Practices and Procedures

C1. As a general rule, an analyst in one agency knows both his counterparts in other agencies and various individuals who are sources of information in related fields. Contacts are sometimes established through one or more of the intelligence community mechanisms -- viz., the USIB substantive committees, representatives meetings on NIEs, coordination of the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), various task teams set up from time to time, and the NIS program. But to a large extent, analysts develop their contacts on an individual basis, often on their own initiative and sometimes aided by suggestions from their predecessors, colleagues, or immediate ~~supervisors~~ superiors.

C2. Both the frequency and agency pattern of analyst-to-analyst communication vary markedly. Most INR offices tend to have more contact with CIA components than with DIA, some rarely consult with CIA analysts except those in OCI, and in at least one instance it was said that the initiative was more often taken by OCI. In part, this pattern reflects the fact that interagency communication occurs more frequently from the purpose of exchanging views on current intelligence items. When the purpose is getting timely information on matters outside of an analyst's special field, the agency and person contacted depends primarily on the particular subject in question. While it is difficult to generalize, the Task Team gained the impression that communication between INR and CIA occurs more regularly because of the CIB and NIE mechanisms, whereas communication between INR and DIA

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is somewhat hampered by such factors as relatively rapid turnover of DIA personnel, the organizational structure of that agency, and a tendency to think of DIA analysts more as sources of information on military affairs than as counterparts who may interpret current developments from a different point of view.

C3. Communication is usually by phone. In many cases there is insufficient time to go to another agency to discuss current developments and when information is sought it is typically needed very promptly. However, much depends on the habits of the individuals involved. Thus, some analysts make a point of meeting with their counterparts periodically to discuss matters of mutual interest other than current intelligence items, while others expressed the hope that circumstances would permit more informal exchange of ideas but felt that the pressure of work always interfered. The nature of an analyst's job also has a direct bearing on his communication practices. Economists in INR, for example, tend to maintain contact with a large number of individuals in both intelligence and non-intelligence agencies, and to communicate with them by phone not so much because of the pressure of time but rather because that method is a more practical way of getting bits and pieces from widely scattered individuals.

C4. Liaison arrangements tend to be used more for document procurement than for establishing contact with knowledgeable individuals in other agencies. In this connection, analysts felt that improvement was needed and some expressed the hope that the LDX system would eventually

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intelligence community. It was noted that ^{analysts} frequently need to see actual documents in order to discuss matters effectively over the phone, that reading excerpts from documents is often impractical, and that teletype transmission is cumbersome.

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D. Impediments to Communication

D1. Almost every aspect of analyst-to-analyst communication can be improved in some respect, but the Task Team found that existing practices were actually working better than it initially expected. Moreover, because effective communication depends very much on the attitude and habits of individual analysts, there are obvious limits to which remedial measures can be expected to improve the situation.

D2. The problem of identifying appropriate officers in other agencies has a number of facets. First, most analysts know their counterparts and contact them directly whenever circumstances warrant doing so. They sometimes need assistance when their counterparts are not available, when they need to direct their inquiry through the chain of command, and when they seek information in fields which neither the analyst nor his counterpart follows in depth. This need could be met by ready access to fairly detailed organization charts or to telephone directories that list key personnel by organizational component. Second, differences in organizational structure sometimes make it difficult to determine who is the counterpart of a division or branch chief and whether there are several components of another agency that might profitably be contacted. Third, the new analyst often needs assistance in identifying both his counterparts and sources of information in other agencies. This problem is essentially an internal agency matter, but the Task Team believes it would be useful to encourage agencies to invite officers from other departments to attend periodic briefings on their organization and functions. Lastly, the identification of the most informed analyst

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on a particular subject is not necessarily the same as the identification of the responsible analyst at the appropriate level in the chain of command. The latter can be accomplished through liaison channels or with the aid of organizational directories; the former depends upon accidental factors, breadth of experience, and individual knowledge. While an inter-agency directory of analysts skills and expertise might be of some help in identifying the knowledgeable persons on particular topics, the Task Force doubts that such a directory would be relied upon by users in preference to their own judgment or that of their colleagues. In addition, it would be very difficult to prepare and to maintain.


D3. Since so much analyst-to-analyst communication is conducted over the phone, it would be desirable to provide better facilities for discussing classified material. Grey phones are available in the three major intelligence agencies, but in INR they are very few in number and are located at some distance from the research offices. If each of these latter offices were provided with a grey phone, analysts in the research offices would probably use it more than they now do. However, we found that these analysts currently use the grey phone less for discussion of codeword material than for discussion of matter classified up through ~~SECRET~~. Moreover, the installation of, say, 10 grey phones outside of the special area would be physically difficult and very expensive. For these reasons, the Task Team concluded that the most that should be considered is an extension of the red phone system in CIA to the other agencies.

D4. (Discussion of red phone system.)

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DATE SENT: 3/2/66 CLASSIFIED MATERIAL T 729396
Copy For Addressee
FROM: Mr. A. S. Buford, III INR/DDC 6638 State
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)
TO: [Redacted] CODIB Support Staff Langley
(Name) (Office Symbol) (Room No.) (Bldg.)
Part V
DATE RECEIVED: 3/3/66
IDENTIFICATION (3) copies of Report of CODIB TASK TEAM

FORM DS-406 RETAINED BY ADDRESSEE FOR 3 YEARS
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*Please file in
VII Rpt Working
Folder until final
report is out
Thank*